Here’s a question for you guys who know armor strategy and tactics better than I:
From my armchair historian’s viewpoint; it seems that by late 1942, especially in the European theatre, light tanks like M3 were little more than death traps for their crews. My question is; how did they fit into the overall US armor doctrine? What job(s) were they supposed to do? With German armor and anti-tank guns plentiful on most fronts, and seemingly every other Wehrmacht soldier carrying a Panzerfaust, what could a company of M3’s actually accomplish on the battlefield without being wiped out? Sometimes I wonder if some weapons/strategies/tactics remain in place beyond their time simply because the bureaucracy figures “well that’s the way we’ve always done it”.
Just thinking out loud here. Would like some input from those with more experience and maybe an inside view.
As you had mentioned, it was just doctrine. That and the loss of production due to retooling for a different type was not acceptable. When you look at the Sherman, it was a tall, poorly armored tank with (originally) a low velocity gun, but that is what we had at the time. But it was simple, reliable and we built thousands of them. The Stuart was similar, and could still be useful against light armor and softskins.
Remember that at the time, the tank was a fairly new kind of weapon, and armies were still deciding on the best way to use them. Only after WW II did we come to the conclusion that a single type of tank would best. But with the currently poular introduction of tank guns on armored cars, perhaps the light tank is making a comeback of sorts.
Don’t forget that there were other theaters of war than the ETO and the Eastern front. In the Pacific, light tanks had a role, though the Sherman was generally deployed as time went on.
And even in Western Europe, light tanks carried out scouting tasks, till they were replaced by vehicles designed for that role.
Light tanks are that…light, true they didn’t pack a punch against the German machines however they could traverse more ground, travel at highr road speeds, and maneuver better in small villages. If a platoon of light tanks managed to get the drop on the larger enemy tanks, they could hold thier own.
Light tanks as mentioned were used as scouts, recon and command vehicles. Being a real threat to soft skins is advantageous too, psychologically being hit by a " puny" gun makes ya just as dead.
As the war progressed, they were generally used as scouting units and infantry support.
So why did the army continue to use them? A lot has to do with the doctrine of “good enough” as changing horses in mid-stream was seen as unnecessary. Also, there is logistics to be considered. You can ship more light tanks in a freighter than heavy tanks, and you will have more ship cranes and dock facilities that can handle their weight as opposed to heavier tanks.
Longer answer: Everyone acts like WW II was one giant armored tank on tank battle. Truth is, the US fielded 46 infantry divisions and 16 armored divisions in Europe during the war. Infantry divisions were pure infantry with three infantry regiments per division. Armed divisions were a mix of armored (tank) and armored infantry units, similar to today’s modern US divisions. See https://history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/ETOOB-TOC.htm for the official US Army OB for the European Theater of World War II. Germany was not any different, Operation Barbarossa involved 100 infantry divisions and 19 armored divisions. To quote from Wikipedia, the infantry division was the backbone of the German Army. For most, if not all of the war, there was a need for infantry support. THe light tank fits this role perfectly. A light tank had several machine guns, a light cannon and was generally immune to small arms fire. Even an M3 looks huge if all you have is a rifle; unless it closes to within 20 meters-ish, grenades are useless. It’s good for any mission that doesn’t require it to fight a medium or heavy tank; recon, patrolling, infantry support in offense or defense. And if it did run into a heavier tank, it could move out of danger fairly quickly.
By late 1942, US Army armor doctrine had barely been tested in battle. Aside from some combat in the Philippines, the first real clash of armor involving US Army armor was during Operation Torch against French Forces in November. They did not meet the Germans until they had driven into Tunisia and ran into German forces rushed there to oppose them. But in late 1942, every army, even the most battle experienced, German and Soviet, still widely deployed light tanks.
North Africa for both US and British forces was a theater where what worked and didn’t work was learned. British forces had a 2 1/2 year campaign to learn those lessons. US forces leaned in a more abbreviated six month period. After North Africa, the proportion of light to medium tanks in US armor units was drastically altered, with mediums becoming the mainstay of the tank battalions. Light tanks were reduced to a single company per battalion. US Armor doctrine evolved as a result of battle experience. As it did for every other army in WWII.
Panzerfausts would not appear on the battlefield until mid 1944, and those were a close in weapon anyways, with a battlefield range of under 100 meters. In some battlefields such as urban or heavy foliage areas, that’s great. In more open terrain, their effectiveness is reduced.
AT guns? Every army has those, and could employ them effectively for prepared defenses. The defending force usually has the advantage in a prepared defense over an attacking force and can inflict disproportionate casualties.
But here is where light tanks come into play. Getting the enemy defenses to reveal themselves by light units, they can be engaged more advantageously by main force units and supporting artillery. Conversely, rapidly moving light units can show where the enemy is not, and relay that information to main force units for exploitation. And as mentioned above, the superior M24 light tank entered the battlefield in late 1944. Its’ 75mm gun certainly packed more punch than the 37mm gun of the M3/M5.
And in the Pacific, where there were large numbers of Army tank battalions employed supporting each infantry division, M3 and M5 light tanks were up to the task of engaging and defeating Japanese armor.
In addition to what others have said, I have seen it noted that about 1/3 of the Soviet tanks involved in the actions around Kursk i n the Summer of 1943 were actually T-60 and T-70 light tanks, and that many Soviet light tanks were built at smaller factories that could not necessarily handle constructing larger tanks.
One last point I might add. Your basic point was on the northwest Europe campaign from D-Day to VE-Day. That campaign lasted only 11 months. The armored force doctrine and TO&E was based off of the battlefield experience in North Africa and Italy. The Normandy fighting was indeed an eye opener, and losses were higher than expected, and the Panther was a major surprise. It was expected to be encountered in limited numbers like the Tiger, not as a standard “medium” tank like the Panzer IV.
Fixes that were already in the pipeline, 76mm gun M4s, were rushed forward. The M36 & M18 GMCs were fielded, M24 was in its final phases of development, and the T26 program was given added priority for completion. But only so much can be done in 11 months. The need had to be identified, solutions thought up, designed, developed, tested, corrected if need be, produced, and fielded. Not to mention the manpower training and logistics in fielding a completely new vehicle or family of vehicles.
The Panther tank is a good example of this sort of thing. The need was identified in summer 1941, design and development occurred during 1942, and the first models rushed into battle at Kursk in summer 1943 before the design bugs had been worked out. More were lost due to mechanical issues than due to combat damage. And that is over the time span of two years.
When we ask “Why light tanks…?”, lets not forget that the Germans moved principly by HORSES in WWII. Although we tend to think panzer and mechanized, horses and mules far outnumbered tanks and trucks in the Wehrmacht.
The book “Storm of steel: the development of armor doctrine in germany and the soviet union, 1919-1939” provides a lot of information on the problem the Germans and Soviets had coming up with armor doctrine and even getting armor units added to their forces. It covers the construction difficulties both countries had producing armor for even the lowest numbers. It can be a bit dry but doctrine and production are explained well and provide a picture why early war armor units looked like they did.
At the beginning of WW2, the 37mm gun was considered an anti-tank gun. More than enough to deal with the tanks of the time. The M2 medium tank and M2 light tank both used the 37 mm. Towed anti-tank guns were 37 mm.
Then after the British fought in Africa, a 75mm gun was determined to be necessary to defeat the German panzers. The US modified the M2 medium tank to accept a 75 mm gun in a casemate sponson which gave us the M3 Lee medium tank. This tank was only a stopgap measure until a turret could be developed to house the 75 mm gun in a fully rotating turret. This became the M4 Sherman. The height of the M3 and M4 were based on the Wright radial engine that was used to power the tanks.
Getting back to the light tanks, M2 and M3. Again their height was determined by the Continental radial engine. After combat input from the British, the M2 was upgraded into the M3 and the M3A1. The British were so pleased with the tanks that they called them “Honey” because they were a “honey of a tank” compared to the British cruiser tanks of the time. The official name was Stuart so in British use you often see them called Stuart Honeys.
Light tanks are not designed to lead the armored force into battle. Tactics of the time were to use infantry and medium tanks to punch a hole into the enemy lines. Once penetration is reached, light tanks are sent into the breach like light horse cavalry. Once in the enemy’s rear area, the light tanks wreak havoc on the enemy’s lines of communication (headquarters area, supply lines, etc.).
The 37 mm gun is more than effective enough against unarmored supply and headquarters type units. Remember, every army in the world was still mainly a foot army with horse drawn vehicles. Even those with mechanization were no match for light tanks. It’s one of the reasons why the predecessor to the M3 light tank, the M2A2 and M2A3 light tanks had twin turrets with .50 caliber machine guns; they’re shooting at virtually unarmed rear area troops and horses. Even the original M3 light tank had the two sponson machine guns fired by the driver like he was a fighter pilot.
The end of the Stuart line culminated in the M3A3 and M5/M5A1 light tanks. By the time these got to the war, tactics had changed and they were considered obsolete. The Germans in Africa were defeated and new tactics were being developed to deal with the eventual invasion of western Europe. It would no longer be a traditional “punch through enemy lines”, but it would be a pursuit of forces withdrawing into Germany. Very fast tank destroyers like M18 Hellcat arrived and new M24 light tanks would be used to maintain contact with enemy rear guard covering the withdrawal. In this case, the M24’s 75 mm gun was much more powerful than the 37 mm of previous light tanks.
Of course, the German rear guard eventually gets overrun, bypassed or just run out of fuel and ammunition. Once you have an army on the run, it’s only a matter of time before the rear guard is gone and your advancing forces are shooting unarmored supply vehicles and personnel carriers. That’s why US tanks like the Chaffee and tank destroyers like the Hellcat were made to be fast. It’s also why these vehicles became obsolete in the US Army so quickly.
Actually the Sherman wasn’t poorly armored for it’s time. Also, yes it was a tall tank, however that was a good thing then. It was able to see other tanks and fire first.
The short answer, and Rob is the word here; is that’s what we had.
He alludes to a separation of discussion.
Online wot and stuff like that load firepower up front. In fact, that’s one of three in the field, setting aside availabilty, what’s on hand and what’s immediately buildable.
Even the first PZK 3 had 37mm and 50mm weapons. But that was on a high speed v ehicle with 3 or 4 crew.
The T 34 had a 76 mm weopon, a three man crew and 50mm armor. A high speed and range of fuel.
Lot’s of variables there, at best a medium tank.
A parallel discussion about the most successful USN aircraft in that war, the Grumman Wildcat.
Why? Lot’s of them, high rate of production, attrition of good pilots on the other side.
At the time, tanks were at their infancy. No one knew what a good tank was supposed to be. Heavy, slow and big gun? Light, fast, small gun? If you look at some of the land battleships the Russians built, or the US M2 medium tanks bristling with machine guns, even the British Crusader had that twin gun mini turret adjacent to the driver.
The US chose mechanical reliability; a tank that could road march 100 miles and roll into battle. The Germans designed mechanical monsters that had to be railed to the fight and needed a lot of logistics.
The Russians chose a fast tank that wore the crew out if they had to travel a great distance, but was extremely effective on home turf.
In the end, it was logistics, and quantity of tanks that won the war.
