OT: Command Continuity on the Battlefield

General Discussion General Modeling Discussion
1

A lot of interesting historical information in this document.
Subjects III & IV are really good.

COMMAND CONTINUITY ON THE AIRLAND BATTLEFIELD
Lessons Learned
Newsletter No. 88-1
http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/88-1/toc7.htm

During World War II, General Erwin Rommel made “commander survivability” a top priority in the Afrika Corps. Indeed, he believed that even “in the smallest action there are tactical tricks which can be used to save casualties” and which “must be made known to the men.” As a result,he instituted what amounted to a field lessons learned program on survivability, subsequently applying these lessons in crash training programs.

Subject III: Historical Perspective
http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/88-1/hisp.htm

Subject IV: Lessons Learned
http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/88-1/lessons.htm

We have grouped the historical and NTC lessons gleaned from our study into two categories. The first deals with ways to prevent the commander from becoming a casualty. The second discusses ways to minimize the effects of a commander’s loss on the unit by preparing for it.

“I did not mean to be killed today.” --Dying words of Vicomte de Turenne, French commander at the Battle of Salzbach, 1675.

"They couldn’t hit an elephant at this dist . . . " --Last words of Union General John Sedgwick, killed during the battle of Spotsylvania, 1864.

2

Although this was dated 1988, when I was at NTC from '91-'95 this was not uncommon.

The entry at 0503 happened frequently. So much so I think we really upset a lot of people. We were “admonished” many times for engaging their TOC. However, it was fun and well worth the trouble. [:D]
0503 hrs, TF TOC destroyed by OPFOR recon.

Subject I: Synopsis of Battle
http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/88-1/synop.htm

SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE

BLUFOR Mission: Defend a battle position.

Location: Central Corridor vic Nelson Impact Area, Hill 1109-Debnam complex. (NK 350170)

ENEMY FORCES: An OPFOR MRR attacking N-W from Hill 876 area (NK 400120) to their Objective-Hill 1011 (Airplane Hill) NK 250210.

0440 hrs, OPFOR enters TF sector marked by Barstow Road. TF Scouts render spot report. Two MRBs abreast, third MRB trails 6-7 km behind. TF goes to full combat posture.

0450 hrs, OPFOR cuts through screen line. As the TF Commander expected, the lead MRBs converge on the east flank of BLUFOR BP.

0500 hrs, OPFOR attempts to force the gap between Hills 1109 and 1141. Area defended by A and B teams. OPFOR taking heavy losses.

0503 hrs, TF TOC destroyed by OPFOR recon. C and D teams (vic BM 872 and BM 887) engaged only by two recon BMPs which are destroyed as it becomes light.

0506 hrs, H66 (TF CDR) is destroyed by direct fire in the gap.0515 hrs, A66 (A TM CDR) destroyed. OPFOR forces gap. B66 (B TM CDR) takes charge oflocal fight. C and D teams unaware of H66’s demise.

0520-0600 hrs, Piece-meal counterattacks by remnants of A and B teams are crushed as trail MRB moves through gap.

0603 hrs, B66 destroyed, C and D teams still in original positions and bypassed.

OPFOR secures objective with MRB (+). What went wrong? The TF was well deployed on favorable terrain. There had been adequate preparation and the TF had adequate warning.

The MRR carried out a classic Soviet attack. Two up, one back. Massing against one point while demonstrating in front of another. In fact, the S2 called it almost perfectly in the IPB.

In this case, the unit failed to do two things:

First, they failed to protect their commander.
Second, they did not prepare for his “death.”

As a result, command and initiative were lost with H66. The OPFOR was able to gain a local 6 to 1 advantage against the battalion and force their way through the position by sheer numbers.

Another Lesson Learned the hard way.